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FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBES: AUTHORITY, JUDICIAL
INTERPOSITION, AND 25 C.F.R. § 83
William W. Quinn, Jr.*
I. Background
One of the numerous intersections between administrative law and
Indian law is found in the Code of Federal Regulations at 25 C.F.R.
§ 83, titled "Procedures for Establishing That an American Indian
Group Exists as an Indian Tribe."' 2 This caption's terms of Indian
"tribe" and Indian "group," both explained in the definitions for 25
C.F.R. § 83, 3 subtly understate both the profound difference in legal
status between federally acknowledged4 and unacknowledged Indian
polities and the exacting yet pliant administrative processes by which
the latter may become the former. The following is an examination
of the previously unsettled but now gradual settling process by which
© 1992 William W. Quinn, Jr.
* Associate, Shea & Wilks, Phoenix, Ariz. J.D., 1989, Arizona State University;
Ph.D., 1981, M.A., 1978, University of Chicago; B.A., 1970, University of Arizona.
1. There is some disagreement in the legal community as to whether a discrete,
circumscribed category of "Indian law" actually exists. At best the view that there is
no Indian law is semantical polemics; at worst it is unreasoned. Notwithstanding the
"seamless web" of the law, it is pragmatically necessary, for convenience's sake, to cite
and refer to as Indian law the tremendous corpus of congressional legislation, case law,
executive orders, treaties, federal regulations, etc., which since the 1770s has dealt with
Indians and U.S.-Indian relations. See generally DAVID H. GETCBES & CEARLES F.
WVxuuNsoN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2d ed. 1986); Faux S. CouEN, HA"NBooK op FEDERAL
INDAN LAWV (1942); id. (1982 ed.). See also the seven volumes of CHARLES J. KAPPLER,
INDIAN AxAms: LAws AND TREAIEs (1904-70), issues of the Indian Law Reporter and
the American Indian Law Review, and West Digest's extensive keynote category under
"Indians."
2. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1982) (originally promulgated as 25 C.F.R. § 54 (1978)).
3. "'Indian tribe' also referred to herein as 'tribe,' means any Indian group within
the continental United States that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to be an
Indian tribe." 25 C.F.R. § 83.1(0 (1991).
.'Indian group' or 'group' means any Indian aggregation within the continental
United States that the Secretary of the Interior does not acknowledge to be an Indian
tribe." Id. § 83.1(g).
4. The terms "acknowledge" and "acknowledgment" are often used interchange-
ably with "recognize" and "recognition." Indeed, even the drafters of 25 C.F.R. § 83
used the terms - perhaps absentmindedly - interchangeably. See, e.g., id. § 83.11(a).
For consistency, "acknowledge" and "acknowledgment" will be used exclusively here,
since these terms more accurately reflect the ethnohistorical reality of the United States'
acknowledging the existence of an extant and continuously surviving American Indian
polity.
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Congress, the federal judiciary, and the United States Department of
the Interior (DOI), or specifically its Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
have either assumed or relinquished responsibility for deciding whether
an unacknowledged American Indian group shall be acknowledged.
The acknowledgment establishes a special bilateral government-to-gov-
ernment relationship between the tribal government and the United
States. This status entitles the tribe to a variety of services and benefits,
which are provided exclusively to American Indian tribes.
Among the many small oddities found in the history of United
States-Indian relations is that not until 1979, fully 157 years after the
establishment of the BIA in 1822, was there a comprehensive list of
exactly which Indian tribes are federally acknowledged and by exclusion
from that list which Indian groups are not.5 The concept of federal
acknowledgment of Indian tribes can be traced from its inchoate
begirnings in American history when the major and formative docu-
ments of American law were being drafted, notably the Articles of
Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and the Constitution.6 At
that time the difficult questions of tribal or Indian identity were as
yet unformulated, because of the relatively simple and clear ethnic
distinctions as to whom or what group was Indian. Moreover, a
tradition of treating Indian tribes as sovereignties - curiously coex-
isting with the antithetical policy of conquest and genocide - had
been engendered and followed by the early colonial powers in North
America, and had influenced the new Americans in their relations with
Indian tribes.7 No definitions of "Indian" or "tribe" existed in these
5. 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (1979). There had been some earlier lists created by the BIA
to determine which tribes were under the "wardship" of the United States or which
were on reservation lands. The most notable of these early lists is found in DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFicE, REPORT ON INDIANs TAXED AND INDIANS NOT TAXED
IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890, at 34-43 (1894). Another notable
list was that used by Commissioner John Collier in 1934 following enactment of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-497 (1988)) (Wheeler-Howard Act), delineating which tribes were eligible
to vote to accept or reject reorganization. Another list compiled in 1952, though not
by the BIA, is found in Report With Respect to the House Resolution Authorizing the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). See H.R. REs.
698, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1040-42 (1952). However, the 1979 list was the first conscious,
explicit delineation of federally acknowledged Indian tribes as such, and was in fact
mandated by the newly promulgated 25 C.F.R. § 83. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(b) (1982).
6. See Aanc~s oF CONFEDERATION art. IX (Nov. 15, 1777); An Ordinance for
the Regulation of Indian Affairs (Aug. 7, 1786) in 31 JOURNALS OF a CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 490-93 (1823); Northwest Ordinance, Act of July 13, 1789, ch. 8, art. III, 1
Stat. 50; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., DoctUMNTs OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
PoLICY 1-17 (Francis P. Prucha ed. 1975).
7. Easily the best and most comprehensive collection of these colonial documents
regarding treaties and relations with Indian tribes is found in ALLEN T. VAucHAN,
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early American documents, nor in a series of six trade or non-inter-
course laws enacted by Congress from 1790 to 1802, the sixth and last
enacted in 1834.8 Yet these laws were enacted at a time when consid-
erable dislocation, assimilation, and cultural disruption had already
ravaged the Atlantic seaboard tribes. Hence, clear and easy distinctions
between tribes and aggregations of assimilated Indian descendants in
the East were beginning to be more difficult.
The task of tracing the origins and development of the concept of
federal acknowledgment or recognition from this period is replete with
terminological problems. The potential for misunderstandings is sig-
nificant owing to the double entendre of the term "recognition." The
terms "wardship" and "guardianship" are common precursors to
recognition in the early government documents. The term "recogni-
tion" has been used in two distinct senses relative to Indian tribes: (1)
in the cognitive sense, i.e., that federal officials simply "know" or
"realize" that an Indian tribe exists, and (2) sometime later, in the
jurisdictional sense, i.e., that the federal government formally acknowl-
edges a tribe's existence as a "domestic dependent nation" with tribal
sovereignty and deals with the tribe in a special relationship on a
government-to-government basis. There appears to be no exact moment
when the jurisdictional sense superseded the cognitive; the distinction
was formulated gradually over time.9
Though congressional enactments tended to leave "Indian" and
"tribe" undefined until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the
courts were grappling with the definitions much earlier. The issue was
not addressed in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia0 or Worcester v. Georgia'I
EARLY AMERicAN INDIAN DocuMENTs: TREATIES AN LAws, 1607-1789, at 1-20 (1984);
see also HowARD H. PECKHIA & CHARLES GIBSON, ATTuDFs OF COLONIAL POWERS
TowARD rn AMERicAc INDIAN (1969).
8. The original "Indian Trade and Intercourse Act" was amended and reenacted
five times, totalling six separate enactments. They were, in order, Act of July 22, 1790,
ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19,
1796, ch. 30, § 12, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, § 12, 1 Stat. 743; Act of
Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 12, 2 Stat. 139. The sixth and final enactment was June 30,
1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988)).
9. For a comprehensive treatment of this area, see William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal
Acknowlegement of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a Legal
Concept, 34 AM. J. LEo. HisT. 331 (1990).
10. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). But see the proleptic statement in the concurrence
by Justice M'Lean in Worcester. "[Where small remnants of tribes remain, surrounded
by white population, and who, by their reduced numbers, had lost the power of self
government, the laws of the state have been extended over them, for the protection of
their persons and property." Id. at 580 (M'Lean, J., concurring).
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(the Cherokee cases), written by Chief Justice Marshall. However,
these landmark opinions set into motion a continuous series of federal
court rulings involving Indian tribal sovereignty that have helped define
both the legal status and the parameters of autonomy and identity for
Indian tribes. Recognition of tribes by the United States, and what
criteria determined such recognition, were the issues in United States
Supreme Court cases approximately thirty years after the Cherokee
cases. 2 Although there have been a myriad of cases since the early
nineteenth century, federal common law has yet to establish a suitable
test to determine tribal status. The cessation of formal treaties between
the United States and Indian tribes, which had been among the prin-
cipal methods for acknowledging tribal entities, occurred in 1871.13
Added to the rapid disintegration of tribal polities and the accompa-
nying assimilation of Indians nationwide, the need for a cogent and
well-defined policy to determine which Indian groups should continue
to maintain or, more importantly, begin a government-to-government
relationship with the United States, became urgent.
Between United States v. Holliday14 and the Wheeler-Howard (Indian
Reorganization) Act of 1934 (IRA),' 5 the jurisdictional sense of "rec-
ognition" finally replaced the cognitive sense. The IRA, and the BIA's
implementation of it, did much toward ameliorating the terminological
confusion and establishing a standard meaning for the term. Yet, from
that point to the mid-1970s, the methods by which those acknowledged '
tribes attained federal acknowledgment were varied and random. Tribes
could still be acknowledged for some purposes and not for others.'
6
It was not until the promulgation of the acknowledgment regulations
in 1978 as 25 C.F.R. § 83 that a systematic, uniform method for
Indian groups to attain federal acknowledgment as Indian tribes was
12. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); United States v. Holliday,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865). In the 1l0-year span from The Kansas Indians to
promulgation of 25 C.F.R. § 83, numerous federal court decisions gave shape to a
rough judicial test to determine tribal status. See infra note 28. Consisting more of
indicia than criteria, this judicial test was borrowed from the high points of case law
dealing with the issue. Among the principal cases in this line during this time span are
Wifiams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261
(1901); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). This judicial test found its most
complete formulation in United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (Washington 1).
13. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 20, § 1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1988)).
14. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
15. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-497 (1988)) (Wheeler-Howard Act).
16. Letter from LaFollette Butler, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Sen.
Henry M. Jackson (Jan. 7, 1974), in AmamcAN INDIAN PoLIcY REVMW CoMMIssIoN,
TASK FORCE #9 REPORT 306 (1977).
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established. The term acknowledgment replaced recognition and sig-
nified an exclusively jurisdictional meaning. The tribes, newly acknowl-
edged under 25 C.F.R. § 83, were acknowledged for all purposes.
Though pressure gradually built in the early 1970s for the DOI to
effect a system that would acknowledge Indian groups that were
unacknowledged, four major events occurring from 1974 to 1977 served
as the catalyst for the eventual promulgation of 25 C.F.R. § 83. The
first of these events was the creation, work, and final recommendations
of Task Force No. 10 of the United States Congress' American Indian
Policy Review Commission. The report essentially chastised various
departments of the United States for their neglect of "nonrecognized"
Indians and made six specific recommendations, including the estab-
lishment of a special office using precise "definitional factors" to
determine tribal status by petitioning unacknowledged Indian groups.'
7
The remaining three events were federal court cases in which the
determination of tribal status stood as the threshold issue. In United
States v. Washington 8 the Ninth Circuit Court of.Appeals held that
Indian tribes exercising treaty fishing rights were entitled to half the
commercial fish catch in the State of Washington, but limited eligibility
to treaty signatories and federally acknowledged tribes. Almost simul-
taneously the First Circuit Court of appeals decided Joint Tribal
Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 9 where, under the
IRA, a federally unacknowledged tribe successfully claimed hundreds
of thousands of acres of land in Maine, which had been illegally
transferred or ceded to the state. The tribe's success was principally
because its status as a tribe was not challenged.
Not surprisingly, in the wake of these decisions the handful of
petitions for federal acknowledgment from Indian groups on file at
the BIA mushroomed. Perplexed as to how to deal with this deluge
of new acknowledgment petitions from nearly forty Indian groups, the
DOI instituted an unofficial moratorium on acknowledging tribes until
a system could be developed. Caught in the middle of this moratorium,
the Stillaguanish Tribe's petition for federal acknowledgment awaited
17. 1 AmucAN INDiAN POLICY REviEw COMM'N, FiNAL REPORT 480-83 (Comm.
Print 1977). The eventual manifestation of these recommendations was the creation of
the Branch of Acknowledgment and Research, Division of Tribal Government Services,
BIA, and the enactment of 25 C.F.R. § 83. Several bills were introduced in both the
House and Senate in the 95th Congress as enabling legislation for the administrative
regulations and office, but none passed. See infra note 53.
18. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976) (Washington 1). For a closer examination of the Washington cases,
and their respective appeals, see Eric Henderson, United States v. Washington H1: Toward
a Judicial Standard of Tribal Status, 24 Aiuz. L. REv. 179 (1982).
19. 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.), aff'g 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975); see also James
D. St. Clair & William F. Lee, Defense of Nonintercourse Act Claims: The Requirement
of Tribal Existence, 31 ME. L. REv. 91, 96 n.27 (1979).
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action by the Secretary until the Tribe, its patience exhausted, sought
equilable relief in federal court. In Stillaguamish Tribe v. Kleppe0 the
court, describing the delay as "arbitrary and capricious," ordered the
DOI to decide on the Stillaguamish petition within thirty days. From
that point the DOI placed the creation of acknowledgment regulations
at a high priority. Within ten months the DOI published its proposed
regulations for acknowledgment of Indian tribes in the Federal Reg-
ister.21
Since the institution of 25 C.F.R. § 83 in 1978, those tribes that
have been newly acknowledged either through the administrative proc-
ess or through legislation have been acknowledged for all purposes.2
20. Civ. No. 75-1718 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1976); see also GETCHES & WILKINSON,
supra note 1, at 250.
21. Proposed regulations were published on June 16, 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,647
(1977). Revised proposed regulations were published on June 1, 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg.
23,743 (1978). The period for public comment for the latter proposal closed on July 3,
1978. Throughout this period from June 16, 1977, the amount of consultation and
discussion with tribes and other interested parties was almost unprecedented relative to
BIA rnlemaking, with a total of 400 meetings, hearings, and conversations. The final,
revised acknowledgment regulations were published on Sept. 5, 1978. See 25 C.F.R. §§
83.1-.11 (1991).
One must be careful to distinguish at the outset between "acknowledgment" and
"restoration" of Indian groups. With regard to the latter, during the "termination"
phase of American Indian policy in the 1950s, Congress terminated the government-to-
government relationship of several Indian tribes. See 2 FRAicls P. PRucHA, THE GMAT
FArRmn 1041-59 (1984). The termination policy subsequently failed. The tribes once
terminated have gradually been "restored" to their former legal statuses as federally
acknowledged via congressional legislation, since the executive is precluded from ac-
knowledging a congressionally terminated tribe. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(e) (1982). Con-
gressional bills to restore Indian tribes are typically referred for comment to the BIA,
which uses the following informal criteria, each requiring an affirmative finding, to
determine whether it will recommend restoration:
(1) There exists an ongoing, identifiable community of Indians who are
members of the formerly recognized tribe or who are their descendants;
(2) The tribe is located in the vicinity of the former reservation; (3) The
tribe has continued to perform self-governing functions either through
clected representatives or in meetings of their general membership; (4)
There is widespread use of their aboriginal language, customs, and culture;
(5) There has been marked deterioration in their socio-economic conditions
since termination; and (6) Their conditions are more severe than in adjacent
rural areas or in other comparable areas within the State.
Internal Memorandum, Branch of Tribal Relations, BIA (n.d.) (on file with author).
22. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a) (1982).
Upon final determination that the petitioner is an Indian tribe, the tribe
shall be eligible for services and benefits from the Federal Government
available to other federally recognized tribes and entitled to the privileges
and immunities available to other federally recognized tribes by virtue of
their status as Indian tribes with a government-to-government relationship
to the United States....
Id. For an example of the full acknowledgment status for tribes acknowledged by
congressional legislation, see infra note 30.
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Prior to 1978, and beginning as far back as the mid-nineteenth century,
tribes were often so designated for specific purposes usually relative
to definitions in statutes.Y Thus, anomalies were created in which
Indian tribes could be tribes for some purposes (e.g., depredations or
takings claims) but not for others (e.g., the provision of services and
benefits to tribes by the United States). Such definitions were typically
elaborate. Federal courts made determinations of tribal status when
questions of applicability of statutes or eligibility for services arose.
The result of a century of such desultory and unfocused judicial rulings
absent any cogent or reasonable federal acknowledgment policy created
chaos. Intermittently sovereign partial-tribes were tribes under some
statutes or common-law tests and not tribes under others or under
BIA definitionsY'
Moreover, creation of such anomalies was not restricted to the
courts. The BIA and the Indian Health Service (IHS) consistently
provided services to individual Indians and Indian descendants while
refusing to recognize or provide services to their respective tribal
governments. A glaring example of a meaningless congressionally be-
23. Two of the most notable of these statutes were the Indian Depredations Act
of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 851, and the Indian Claims Commission Act of Aug. 13,
1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049. Each makes very general references to "tribe" and "band"
requiring further definition by the United States Court of Claims and the Indian Claims
Commission as a branch of that court. See, e.g., Dobbs v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl.
308 (1898); Tully v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 1 (1896); Graham v. United States, 30
Ct. Cl. 318 (1895); see also Peoria Tribe v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 1009 (1965);
Nooksack Tribe v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 712 (1963); Upper Chehalis Tribe v.
United States, 155 F. Supp. 226 (Ct. Cl. 1957); Loyal Creek Band or Group of Creek
Indians, 1 Indian Cl. Comm'n 122 (1949).
24. A cursory perusal of RIcHARD S. JoNEs, FEDERAL PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE TO
AMERiCAN INDIANS (Comm. Print 1985) (U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs) will
reveal that 50 separate federal agencies provide some services, benefits, or programs to
American Indians, and that most agencies have different criteria for eligibility to these
entitlements (i.e., Indians or Indian tribes) for "different purposes.'- Although many
agencies now require federal acknowledgment of the tribe or individual membership or
enrollment in federally acknowledged tribes for eligibility, many still do not. How those
agencies not requiring federal acknowledgment make proper determinations as to who
or what entity is eligible, beyond taking claims of "Indian-ness" at face value, is a
mystery. Statistics of the United States Census Bureau show that, according to the self-
determined racial category on the 1980 decennial census, approximately 600,000 persons
not serviced or accounted for as Indians by the BIA chose the "Native American" or
"American Indian" category - a 72% increase from the previous decennial census of
1970. Moreover, the author estimates that 10% to 15% of the 126 Indian groups
currently petitioning for federal acknowledgment under 25 C.F.R. § 83 are essentially
bogus Indian groups, or Indian descendant recruitment organizations, composed of
predominantly white persons (who may or may not believe themselves to be Indians or
Indian descendants) masquerading as Indians. See also GETCHES & WrIKINsoN, supra
note 1, at 251-52; cf. FEux S. COHEN's HANDBooK OF FEDERAL IND N LAW (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
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stowed federal acknowledgment is found in the politically motivated
Lumbee Indians of North Carolina Act of 1956. This Act gave the
Lumbee people federal acknowledgment, but for no purpose.
26
Although fractured statuses of Indian tribes are still present, there
has been an increasing tendency in recent years to acknowledge tribes
for ll purposes. Newly acknowledged tribes now become eligible for
the entirety of services and benefits provided to Indian tribes, 27 and
this simple "in or out" distinction has created a clean bifurcation
between acknowledged Indian tribes and unacknowledged Indian groups.
Acknowledgment for all purposes and its attendant access to these
entitlements serves as the principal enticement for those Indian groups
as yet unacknowledged to petition the United States, through the DOI,
for new legal status.
The issue of which branch of government should or is properly
authorized to acknowledge American Indian tribes remains unsettled.
The recent record seems to be formulating which branch is most
appropriate for the acknowledgment determination.
Since the promulgation of 25 C.F.R. § 83, there have been seven
federal courts cases that have addressed, to some degree, the issue of
tribal existence or federal acknowledgment.2 The various federal dis-
trict and appeals courts have split as to whether they had jurisdiction
to make such determinations or whether they should defer to the
administrative process within the BIA. The latter would be consistent
with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts making their own
judicial determinations of tribal existence have used a patchwork case-
25. Act of June 7, 1956, ch. 375, 70 Stat. 254.
26. Id. Congress, which gave with one hand by declaring that these people shall
"be known and designated as Lumbee Indians of North Carolina," took away with the
other: "[N]othing in this Act shall make such Indians eligible for any services performed
by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, and none of the
statutes which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be applicable to
the Lumbee Indians." 70 Stat. at 255. Subsequent to submitting their documented
petition on December 17, 1987, the Lumbees tried once again for congressional ack-
nowledgment. On July 14, 1988, Rep. Rose (D.-N.C.) introduced House Bill 5042, "A
Bill to Provide Federal Recognition for the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina." (A
companion bill, Senate Bill 2672, was introduced in the Senate on July 29, 1988, by
Sen. Sanford (D-N.C.)). Hearings on the legislation were held before the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs on August 11, and Assistant Secretary Swimmer opposed
the bill on grounds that a documented petition was pending. With no real support, the
bill died. See H.R. 5042, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
27. For a brief description of these entitlements, see William W. Quinn, Jr., Public
Ethnohistory? Or, Writing Tribal Histories at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 10 Pun.
HsToRiAN 71, 74 (1988).
2:. James v. DHS, 824 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Price v. Hawaii, 764 F.2d 623
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Hou Hawaiians v. Hawaii, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986);
United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.
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law test. The foundation is Montoya v. United States;29 Montoya's
accretions have formed a judicial test of sorts. Congress, in the mean-
time, has enacted four separate pieces of legislation since 1978 bestow-
ing federal acknowledgment on four new Indian tribes. 0
II. Authority to Acknowledge Indian Tribes
A. Congressional Authority
It is virtually axiomatic in Indian law that the Congress has "plenary
power"'" concerning Indian affairs. This control over American In-
dians and their affairs stems predominantly from the so-called "Indian
Commerce Clause." 32 The single grant of power awarded Congress by
the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to "regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." '33 This authority is not unlimited, however, since
it is subject both to constitutional constraints and judicial review.
Congressional authority to acknowledge Indian tribes was specifically
Duwamish, Samish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie & Steilacoom Indian Tribes v. Washington,
454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, No. Civ. 74-842 PHX
EHC (D. Ariz. Dec. 30, 1974); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, No. Civ. H-77-434 MJB
(D. Conn. 1977); Cherokee Indians v. United States, No. Civ. C-83-1111-R (M.D.N.C.
Jan. 30, 1986) (order dismissing action); Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United
States, 639 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (whether tribes can call election and reorganize
under IRA).
29. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or similar race,
united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting
a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory; by a 'band,' a company
of Indians not necessarily, though often, of the same race or tribe, but
united under the same leadership in a common design.
Id. at 266; cf. Henderson, supra note 18, at 184-85.
30. The four Indian tribes congressionally acknowledged since the promulgation of
25 C.F.R. § 83 in 1978 are: the Maliseet Tribe of Maine (Act of Oct. 10, 1980, 94
Stat. 1785); the Cedar City Band of Paiutes in Utah (Act of Apr. 3, 1980, 94 Stat.
317); the Cow Creek Band of Umpquas in Oregon (Act of Dec. 29, 1982, 96 Stat.
1960); and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut (Act of Oct. 18, 1983, 97
Stat. 851). Technically, the congressional acknowledgment of the Pasqua Yaqui of
Arizona falls within this category, as they were acknowledged just two weeks after final
publication of 25 C.F.R. § 83 (Act of Sept. 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 712). However, the
Yaquis were expressly precluded from administrative acknowledgment by previous leg-
islation, so Congress was their only alternative for federal acknowledgment.
31. See CoHEN, supra note 24, at 217 ("[Mhe cases have described Congress' power
over Indian affairs as 'plenary."'). The federal court cases circumscribing this power
are too numerous to list, but an admirable job was done by Cohen. Id. at 211-14.
32. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cd. 3.
33. Id.
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tempered by judicial decision in United States v. Sandoval.3 4 There,
the court announced the rather self-evident principle that even Congress
may not confer federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe upon any
aggregation of people who claim to be Indian.35 As straightforward as
this principle seems, it is not clear in the event the legislative acknow-
ledgment is challenged what standards should be used by Congress or
by the courts in determining which Indian groups are "acknowledge-
able.'' 36
Concerning federal acknowledgment in light of the Sandoval deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court announced a second limitation
of Congress's plenary power over Indians in Delaware Tribal Business
Committee v. Weeks.37 The Court held that exercises of Congress'
plenary power over Indians must be "rationally related" to the pur-
poses of the government-to-government relationship.38 However, as
L.R. Weatherhead has observed, "In fact there is no case in which a
congressional judgment or enactment has been overturned on the basis
of the above limitations."" Congress' plenary power over Indian
affairs and Indian tribes regarding federal acknowledgment of those
tribes appears in fact to be "plenary," notwithstanding the judicially
-4. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
35. "Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or
body of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian
tribe .... " Id. at 46.
36. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 5 nn.16 & 17. It may well have been such
uncertainty that precipitated Congress's unique and anomalous "acknowledgment" of
the Lumbees in 1956 (see supra note 26), and which caused the desuetude of Senate
Bill 1142, "A Bill to Provide Federal Recognition of the Mowa Band of Choctaw
Indians of Alabama," intioduced on May 6, 1987 by Sen. Shelby (D.-Ala.) in the 100th
Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. 6096-97 (1987).
37. 430 U.S. 73, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977); cf. L.R. Weatherhead, What
Is an "Indian Tribe"? - The Question of Tribal Existence, 8 AM. INDIA L. Rav. 1,
3-4 (1980).
38. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 84.
39. Weatherhead, supra note 37, at 4. Although the judiciary has never denounced
a congressional acknowledgment, the executive has. In 1983 President Reagan vetoed
Senate Bill 366, the first bill that would have federally acknowledged the Mashantucket
or Western Pequot Tribe in Connecticut. The rationale used by the President is not
dissimilar from that governing primary jurisdiction cases between executive agencies and
the courts. In his veto message of July 5, 1983, the President enunciated three reasons
why he vetoed the bill, the third of which was that
the Tribe may not meet the standard requirements for Federal recognition
-.. The government to government relationship between the Western
Pequot Tribe and the Federal Government that would be established by
this bill is not warranted at this time, pending further study by Interior.
Extending Federal recognition to the tribe would bypass the Department
of the Interior's administrative procedures that apply a consistent set of
eligibility standards in determining whether or not Federal recognition
should be extended to Indian groups.
129 CONo. Rac. 54155 (1983).
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imposed limitations on its power and the threat of judicial voidance
of a congressional acknowledgment of a group subsequently shown
not to be culturally, biologically, and politically Indian. Though there
may be little dispute about Congress' plenary power in this area, the
issue of the delegation of that power to the Executive Branch does
raise new questions.
B. Executive or Administrative Authority
The administrative law rubric of "subordinate delegation" falls
under the dual authority of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)
to (1) acknowledge American Indian tribes and (2) to promulgate rules
pursuant to that authority in order to determine which Indian groups
should be acknowledged as tribes. This authority, as stated in 25
C.F.R. § 83, rests initially upon 5 U.S.C. § 301, 40 which provides
simply that "[tihe head of an Executive department ... may prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the
custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. ' '41
This statute arguably failed to provide the Secretary with the authority
to promulgate 25 C.F.R. § 83, as those rules are predominantly
substantive and interpretive. The type of rules under the rulemaking
power authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 301 appear to be housekeeping, with
some procedural.
The second grant of authority Congress delegated to the Secretary
to acknowledge Indian tribes cited in 25 C.F.R. § 83, is found in 25
U.S.C. §§ 2, 9.42 Section 2 involves a congressionally mandated sub-
delegation of authority from the Secretary of the Interior to the
Commissioner43 of Indian Affairs, under which the Commissioner shall
40. The codified statute alone is cited under "Authority" in the Code of Federal
Regulations. Congress gave this power to federal agencies by the Act of Sept. 6, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 379.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
42. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) is otherwise section 463 of the Revised Statutes, derived
from the Act of July 9, 1832, ch. 174, § 1, 4 Stat. 564, and the Act of July 27, 1868,
ch. 259, § 1, 15 Stat. 228. Almost as old, 25 U.S.C. § 9 is otherwise section 465 of
the Revised Statutes and derived from the Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, § 17, 4 Stat.
738. See 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1988). A comprehensive legal analysis of these was made by
Solicitor Nathan Margold in 1935. See I U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OPINIONS OF THE
SOLIcIroR, INDIAN ArsAms 531-37 (1974).
43. The post of commissioner of Indian Affairs no longer exists. Yielding to the
pressure of certain Indian political action committees whose members felt that a com-
missioner was not equal in stature to the other assistant secretaries of the Interior as
separate agency heads, DOI officials changed the position to "Assistant Secretary of
the Interior-Indian Affairs" in the late 1970s, thus ending an established and hoary
tradition of more than 150 years. See ROBERT M. KvAsNiCKA & HERmaN J. VIoLA, THE
COMMSSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAiRs, 1824-1977, at xvi (1979).
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"agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have
the management of all Indian Affairs and of all matters arising out
of ]Indian relations." 44 Similarly, this statute - essentially a grant of
managerial authority - would arguably not authorize the Secretary or
Commissioner to establish a perpetual government-to-government re-
lationship via federal acknowledgment with an Indian group not al-
ready under the Department's aegis.
Section 9 delegates legislative authority to the President and au-
thorizes "[t]he President [to] prescribe such regulations as he may
think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act
relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the accounts of
Indian affairs." Though this section is unquestionably an authorization
from Congress for the President to make rules regarding Indian affairs,
and though under the doctrine of subdelegation the President may
give that authority to either the Secretary or Commissioner, the grant
expressly limits this rulemaking authority to effecting the provisions
of existing congressional acts. 4 Thus, arguably the introduction of a
new Indian tribe - absent any enabling legislation acknowledging such
tribe - into the number already serviced by the DOI would not be
authorized under this statute alone.
The last authority cited in 25 C.F.R. § 83 are chapters 1 and 2 of
part 230 of DOI's Departmental Manual.46 The chapters further del-
egate the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs' (formerly the Com-
missioner's) general authority to regulate Indian affairs to his deputies.
Any challenger to DOI's authority acknowledging Indian tribes under
25 C.F.R. § 83 would discover a lack of meaningful standards and
the absence of an "intelligible principle" in the delegations cited in
the enabling legislation and its codified sections. To date no such
challenges have been made. However, not only have there been threats
414. 25 U.S.C. § 2 0988).
45. The two most commonly cited congressional acts pertaining to delegation and
authority to regulate and supervise Indian affairs are similarly broad and vague. See
Act of Nov. 2, 1921, ch. 115, 42 Stat. 408 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)) (Snyder
Act); Act of Apr. 16, 1934, ch. 147, § 1, 48 Stat. 596 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 452
(1988)) (Johnson-O'Malley Act). Neither of these statutes has any clear standards or
definitions relative to acknowledgment of Indian tribes, but rather are very broad grants
of authority to provide for existing Indian tribes. Therefore, if the reliance on 25 U.S.C.
§ 9 in 25 C.F.R. § 83 anticipates the Snyder and Johnson-O'Malley Acts, the result is
vagueness supported by other vagueness. .
46. 230 DM 1.1 to 1.4 (Feb. 9, 1987) (#2729) (replacing previous version of July
3, 1986 (92689)); 230 DM 2.1, 2.2 (Feb. 9, 1987) (#2729) (new). Thus, the completed
line of subordinate delegation and subdelegation putatively to acknowledge Indian tribes
begins in Congress and flows through the President, the Secretary of the Interior and
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior -
Indian Affairs, where it ceases. See also 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTIuoR, OPINIONs OF
THE SOLICITOR, INDuIN AFFAIS 1211 (1974).
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to deny the validity of DOI's authority to federally acknowledge Indian
tribes, but certain parties believe that the presumption should be that
petitioning Indian groups are tribes and the DOI has the burden of
proving they are not tribes.47 The current presumption is that Indian
groups are not tribes and the DOI has the burden of proving they are
tribes.
The consensus of the commentators on administrative law issues of
delegation, meaningful standards or intelligible principles with dele-
gation, and the nondelegation doctrine indicate - though none ad-
dresses the question directly - that the Secretary has the authority
both to acknowledge Indian tribes and to promulgate regulations to
effect such acknowledgments. This consensus is in turn reflected in
the DOI's policy statements and memoranda, especially those from
the Office of the Solicitor advocating the Secretary's authority. The
most concise, and simultaneously the most comprehensive, statement
on these issues is found in Kenneth Davis' Administrative Law Treatise:
Congress may and does lawfully delegate legislative power
to administrative agencies. The Supreme Court has said
many times - more than a hundred - that standards are
required, but it has often held that standards are not re-
quired. The Supreme Court throughout the twentieth cen-
tury has upheld congressional delegations without standards,
and except for two 1935 decisions, it has never held uncon-
stitutional any delegation to an administrative agency. Since
1935 the nondelegation doctrine has had no reality in the
holdings, although remnants of the doctrine persist in ju-
dicial verbiage. 4
47. See Terry Anderson, Federal Recognition: The Vicious Myth, 4 AM. INDIAN J.
7, 19 (1978) ("[T]he idea that the federal government can exclude tribes from recognition
is false. The simple fact is that there is no basis in law for the federal government to
exclude certain tribes from the benefits of the federal trust responsibility to Indians
because they lack the ill-defined status of federal recognition."); cf. I AimmcA PoLicY
Ravmw ComsioN, FnAL REPORT 461 (1977) ("There is no legitimate foundation for
denying Indian identification to any tribe or community. The BIA has no authority to
refuse services to any member of the Indian population."); id. at 479 ("Every Indian
tribal group which seeks recognition must be recognized; every [BIA] determination that
a group is not an Indian tribal group must be justified .... "). The apodictic tone of
these assertions indicates a naive assumption that all claims to being Indian or an Indian
tribe are genuine, or that such determinations are simple to make, with polar "black
or white" alternatives determinable on prima facie evidence.
48. 1 K mNNE C. DAvis, ADmuTRATmnv LAW TREATISE § 3.1, at 149-50 (2d ed.
1979). The "two 1935 decisions" are, of course, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935) ("[The Recovery Act] supplies no standards for any
trade, industry, or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be
applied [and] sets up no standards... This is delegation running riot."), and Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) ("[Clongress has declared no policy,
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Though written a decade ago, this statement still describes the current
state of the law.
49
Notwithstanding the current impuissance of the nondelegation doc-
trine in federal law, or alternatively, assuming that the Rehnquist
Court readopts the meaningful standards requirement for congressional
delegations of legislative authority, one might legitimately ask where
in the statutes cited as authority in 25 C.F.R. § 83, viz., 5 U.S.C. §
301 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9, are to be found any meaningful standards
or any intelligible principle 0 authorizing the Secretary of the Interior
to create a quasi-sovereign political entity using a highly complex set
of legal and ethnohistorical criteria which he himself promulgated
under color of this authority.
The question is answered variously by DOI officials and other
commentators. The issue came to fruition at the DOI in 1974 during
the decision-making process concerning the Stillaguamish Tribe's pe-
titio n for federal acknowledgment; the determination involved whether
the Secretary's federal acknowledgment of an Indian group by admin-
istrative fiat would be ultra vires. In August 1974 the Associate Solic-
itor - Indian Affairs wrote a memorandum to the Solicitor titled
"Secretary's Authority to Extend Federal Recognition to Indian
has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition
of circumstances and conditions. . . ."). Cf. BERARDP ScwAsRTz, ADmINisTRATnE LAW:
A CASEBOOK 79 (3d. ed. 1988) ("Suffice it to say that most federal agencies are vested
with powers of subordinate legislation.").
49. Three major cases have been decided - or affirmed - in recent years by the
Supreme Court concerning standards in delegation and the nondelegation doctrine. Synar
v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 475
U.S. 714 (1986); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981);
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
Though none held the enabling legislation unconstitutional for lack of meaningful
standards, Justice Rehnquist argued that "[w]e ought not to shy away from our judicial
duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority. . ." Id. at 686
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also YI rNNL C. DAvis, 1982 SrPPLEMENT To AD iN-
IST=RAmWE LAW TEAnnsE, § 3:1, at 11-14 (1982).
50. The "intelligible principle" concept appears to have been a sort of second-
string back-up to the more tangible "meaningful standards" judicial test. Presumably
realizing that Congress, generally lacking specialist expertise, or perhaps subject to the
compromise syndrome, could not always produce precise legislation to cover complex
issues with meaningful standards, the Court instituted the intelligible principle, which
first appeared as such in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928). The Court insisted that legislative delegations, in the absence of meaningful
standards, should have at the least an intelligible principle to guide administrative
agencies in the application of the law. It would appear that today the intelligible
principle is just as moribund as the meaningful standard relative to the nondelegation
doctrine. Id. at 409.
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Tribes."'" In the memorandum the Associate Solicitor relied on dicta
in Holliday to establish not the Secretary's authority but the Court's
acquiescence in following the executive when tribal status is in dispute
and on a tautological comment by the Secretary regarding some Burns
Paiute Indian Colony legislation, which took land in trust stating that
this group was acknowledged when the Commissioner approved its
constitution.5 2 Although its title is tantalizing, this memorandum con-
talned exiguous definitive data about the Secretary's authority to ac-
knowledge Indian tribes.
This nebulous basis for and exercise of authority by the Secretary
to acknowledge Indian tribes was reflected three years later in a letter
to Congress from the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs. The
Assistant Secretary responded negatively to proposed legislation that
would establish both regulations and an office for federal acknow-
ledgment.53 In a somewhat equivocal statement, the Assistant Secretary
declared that "[w]hile we believe that the Secretary has that authority
[to acknowledge Indian tribes], under 5 U.S.C. § 301 and sections 463
and 465 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9), there is no specific
legislative authorization. ' 5 4 Moreover, while the DOI did object to
these bills, which would effectively preempt the authority of the Sec-
retary, "[The DOI] would not object to a bill which specifically
confirms the Secretary of the Interior's authority to recognize addi-
tional Indian groups." ' 55 This last statement is little more than a plea
for insurance, in case the Courts subsequently determined that the
Secretary is without such authority. Such a bill has never been enacted,
or even introduced.
Most of these memoranda and building-block attempts at establish-
ing the Secretary's authority to acknowledge Indian tribes by exhuming
obscure legal precedents skirted the principal reason for such authority
- perhaps because the reason was too obvious, or perhaps because it
51. Memorandum from Reid P. Chambers, Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs,
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Solicitor (Aug. 20, 1974) (on file
with the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor); see also Act of Oct.
30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-488, 86 Stat. 806.
52. Id.
53. In an apparent response to recommendations of Task Force No. 10 of the
AIPRC (see supra note 17), various bills were introduced in both the Senate (Senate
Bill 2375) and the House (House Bill 12,996 and House Bill 13,773) in the second
session of the 95th Congress. Hearings on these bills were held, and printed, on both
sides. Because of an apparent race between Congress and the Executive to establish
acknowledgment regulations and the competition which thereby ensued, the DOI, not
surprisingly, refused to support the legislation. See S. 2375, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
H.R. 13773, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 12996, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
54. Letter from Rick V. Lavis, Acting Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, to Hon. Morris Udall (Aug. 8, 1978), in Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1979).
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was perceived to be insufficiently juridical. The simple fact is the
Secretary has this authority because he has always exercised it, irre-
spective of proper delegation from Congress. This circular logic is even
alluded to in the Associate Solicitor's memorandum describing the
"significance" of the Secretary's statement concerning the Burns Paute
Indian Colony legislation: "[Tihe Secretary has previously recognized
and exercised the authority of the Executive Branch to extend recog-
nition to Indian tribes and ... Congress has been made aware that
the Secretary believes that he has the authority to recognize tribes."
'56
If the Associate Solicitor had sought authority for this legal proposi-
tion, he would have found a United States Supreme Court decision
directly on point. In ruling on the extent of the authority of the
Secretary of the Interior where Congress had been silent, the Court in
United States v. Midwest Oil Co. held:
Both officers, lawmakers, and citizens naturally adjust
themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive
Department, on the presumption that unauthorized acts
would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to
crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not
reasoning in a circle, but the basis of a wise and quieting
rule that, in determining the meaning of a statute or the
existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage
itself, even when the validity of the practice is the subject
of investigation.
5 7
This administrative exercise of power is not a case of the Secretary
expropriating or usurping the plenary power of Congress to authorize
the federal acknowledgment of Indian tribes. Rather, the issue is a
matter of the Secretary's historically exercising such authority where
a vacuum of responsibility existed over decades, resulting in a gradual
and unchallenged accretion of this authority. Were the doctrine of
laches to apply to the exercise of authority under the separation of
powers, Congress would thus have forfeited its exclusive prerogative
to acknowledge Indian tribes.
56. Chambers, supra note 51, at 3; see also COHEN, supra note 24, at 16 ("[Iun
1819 the federal government began to provide special services to Indians through general
federad statutes. Most . . .are rendered under general congressional enactments, which
often fail to define with any precision the limits of the intended service population.");
Anderson, supra note 47, at 12 ("It is apparent that administrative authority for
recognition of previously unrecognized tribes does exist and has been exercised."); cf.
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975) ("Those limitations [on congres-
sional delegations] are, however, less stringent in cases where the entity exercising the
delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter."
(citations omitted)).
57. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915).
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In the final analysis, unless the United States Supreme Court effects
a startling reversal of direction and delivers a coup de main to stare
decisis relative to the nondelegation doctrine,58 the aggregate of sec-
retarial tradition plus the broad authority cited in 25 C.F.R. § 83
allowing administrative federal acknowledgment of Indian tribes is
probably enough to establish the Secretary's authority. So established,
and under the current state of the law on nondelegation in which
"[t]he judicial tendency is to uphold virtually all delegations - even
where the standards contained are so broad as to be illusory,"5 9 any
challenge in federal court to the Secretary's authority to federally
acknowledge Indian tribes and promulgate regulations to that end
would almost certainly fail.
C. Administrative Procedures for Federal
Acknowledgment of Indian Tribes
What then are the regulations' criteria used by the Secretary in the
discretionary exercise of his authority to confer federal acknowledg-
ment on an Indian tribe? The "basic procedure" is.one of ascertaining
facts through informal adjudication and ultimately adjudging whether
a petitioning Indian group meets the mandatory criteria in the regu-
lations by applying the standards set forth in 25 C.F.R. § 83. In sharp
contrast to an adversarial trial-type procedure with all its due process
accoutrement, the informal adjudication procedure is very well tailored
to the needs of the task. The job requires an evaluation of complex
and often ambiguous data and/or issues of ethnohistory, cultural
anthropology, and genealogy6° (and sometimes administrative law). 61
58. This is by no means beyond possibility. Indeed, one might even regard as
prescient the Chief Justice's concurrence in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Amer-
ican Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 662 (1980) and Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined
by the Chief Justice, in American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
542 (1981) calling for the reinstitution of a revised nondelegation doctrine.
59. ScnvAa Tz, supra note 48, at 117; cf. United States v. Washington, 476 F.
Supp. 1101, 1103 (W.D. Wash. 1979) (Washington III) ("Neither Congress nor the
Executive Branch has prescribed any standardized definition for either the term 'Indian'
or 'Indian tribe' in terms of the special federal relationships with Indians.") (Finding
of Fact #6). One might rebut this finding by pointing to the combination of 25 C.F.R.
§ 83.1(0 and § 83.7(a)-(g) (1991).
60. 3 DAvis, supra note 48, § 14:4, at 24. For a legal analysis of the scope and
requirement of the regulations, see Blackwell & Mehaffey, American Indians, Trust and
Recognition, in NoNRlcoomD AmEica, INLAN TRmFs: ANs HITRIcAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE (Frank W. Porter ed., 1983) (available from the Newberry Library's Center
for the History of the American Indian, Chicago, Ill.).
61. See Memorandum from the Assistant Solicitor, Branch of Tribal Government
and Alaska, to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs (Apr. 3, 1987)
("Issues Pertaining to Acknowledgment of San Juan Southern Paiutes and Relationship
of 25 C.F.R. § 83, 83.1(k), 83.3(d), and 83.7(c) and (f)") (six pages) (on file with the
Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.).
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After the proposed regulations were published in the Federal Register
in 1977, sixty written comments were received from government offi-
cials, historians, anthropologists, tribal leaders, petitioning Indian
groups, lawyers, and congressional staff members, resulting in the
revised proposed regulations which became final in 1978 and now
constitute 25 C.F.R. § 83.
For an unacknowledged Indian group to become an acknowledged
tribe, the tribe must meet successfully all seven mandatory criteria
found specifically in 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (a)-(g). Such a petitioning group
must: (a) establish that it has been identified from historical times to
the present on a substantially continuous basis as "American Indian"
or "aboriginal"; (b) establish that a substantial portion of the group
inhabits a specific area or lives in a community viewed as American
Indian and distinct from other populations in the area, and that its
members are descendants of an Indian tribe which historically inhabited
a specific area; (c) furnish a statement of facts which establishes that
the group has maintained tribal political influence or other authority
over its members as an autonomous entity throughout history until
the present; (d) furnish a copy of the group's present governing
document, or in the absence of such a written document, a statement
describing in full the membership criteria and the procedures through
which the group currently governs its affairs and its members; (e)
furnish a list of all known members based on the group's own defined
membership criteria, and show that the membership consists of indi-
viduals who have established descendancy from a tribe that existed
historically or from historical tribes that combined and functioned as
a single autonomous entity; (f) establish that the membership of the
group is composed principally of persons who are not members of
any other North American Indian tribe; and (g) establish that neither
the group nor its members are the subject of congressional legislation
that has expressly terminated or forbidden the federal relationship. 62
Since the burden of proof to substantiate the claim of continuous
tribal existence under these criteria rests with the petitioner, voluminous
ethnohistorical data are usually submitted by the petitioner and often
by parties opposed to federal acknowledgment of the petitioner.63 Upon
62. Though this is essentially a paraphrase of the relevant criteria in the regulations
at 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.7(a)-(g) (1991), it is nonetheless loyal to the Code's wording.
63. Though categorized as "informal adjudication" under the prevailing taxonomy
of administrative law procedure, the process can be quite adversarial, sans the typical
courtroom modus operandi. For example, aggressive opposition was made to the ack-
nowledgment petitions of the Samish and Snohomish by the Tulalip Tribes; to that of
the San Juan Southern Paiutes by the Navajo Tribe; to that of the Gay Head Wam-
panoags by the Gay Head Taxpayer's Association; and to that of the Mohegans by the
State of Connecticut. The Tulalip Tribes, Navajo Tribe, and the Gay Head Taxpayer's
Association were represented by large law firms in their opposition, and Connecticut
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completion of this long and assiduous process by the Secretary's staff,
the Secretary will decide, based upon the recommendation, as to
whether or not to acknowledge the petitioner as an Indian tribe. Since
1978 the Secretary has acknowledged eight tribes under 25 C.F.R. §
83, but the federal courts have not always acceded to his administrative
prerogative to do so.
III. Primary Jurisdiction, Political Question, and Exhaustion
It may be asserted with a relatively high degree of certainty that
authority is vested in the Secretary of the Interior to federally ac-
knowledge Indian tribes. The Supreme Court imposes limitations upon
the Secretary and the Congress that share their plenary power authority
over Indian affairs. Two methods exist by which an unacknowledged
Indian group can obtain federal acknowledgment as a tribe: secretarial
and congressional. Although this replication or bifurcation is suffi-
ciently enigmatic of itself, the analysis is further complicated by a
third element, the ability of the federal courts to confer what amounts
to federal acknowledgment upon an unacknowledged Indian group for
the purposes of the issue before them. 64 Where this leaves the doctrine
of separation of powers is a question that may best be answered by
divination.
More germane than which branch of government has the authority
to acknowledge Indian tribes and from whence this authority derives,
is the issue of which branch should decide - to which branch does
the decision to acknowledge an Indian tribe rightfully and properly
belong? To rephrase the question in succinct administrative law terms,
by its assistant attorney general. The opposition data and documents submitted by these
opposing parties were voluminous (the Connecticut attorney general's being 11 thick
volumes), and were nearly all submitted prior to or at the outset of the year-long
petition evaluation process.
64. The most salient example of recent judicial determination of tribal status is
Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir. 1975),
aff'g 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975). The decision states, in pertinent part:
IT]he trust relationship [between the Tribe and the United States] we
affirm has as its source the Nonintercourse Act, meaning that the trust
relationship pertains to land transactions which are or may be covered by
the Act, and is rooted in rights and duties encompassed or created by the
Act. Congress or the executive branch may at later time recognize the
Tribe for other purposes within their powers, creating a broader set of
federal responsibilities....
Id. at 379. Shortly after this decision the DOI did in fact administratively acknowledge
the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Tribes of Maine for all purposes. See also John M.
Paterson & David Roseman, A Reexamination of Passamaquoddy v. Morton, 31 ME.
L. REv. 114 (1979); PAUL BRODEUR, RESTTruTioN: THE LAND CLAims OF THE MASEPEE,
PASSAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDiANS OF NEW ENGLAND passim (1985).
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which branch of government has "primary jurisdiction" to decide the
issue of tribal existence? The examination of this question necessarily
entails examination of two tangentially related issues; namely, the
notion of exhaustion of administrative process before a judicial deter-
mination or review, and whether or not the acknowledgment of Indian
tribes is a nonjusticiable "political question" properly left to the
political branches.
Though federal agencies and federal courts will often have concur-
rent jurisdiction over an issue, one or the other forum is usually better
suited to settle questions of fact first. Kenneth Davis, in his charac-
teristically clear style, notes that "primary jurisdiction is a doctrine of
common law, wholly court-made, that is designed to guide a court in
determining whether and when the court should refrain from or post-
pone the exercise of its own jurisdiction so that an agency may first
answer some question presented." 65 Elsewhere Davis adds that "the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction normally allocates power to make
initial determinations, not final determinations; it normally governs
when a court may act, not whether it may.' ' As regards the federal
acknowledgment of Indian tribes, the issue of primary jurisdiction can
be divided into three categories corresponding to different time frames:
(1) before the publication of the proposed rules in 25 C.F.R. § 83,
i.e., before 1977; (2) during the process of promulgating the regulations
at 25 C.F.R. § 83, i.e., from 1977 to late 1978; and (3) after publication
of the final rule and establishment of the BIA office in late 1978, i.e.,
from 1978 to the present.
Those cases involving the issue of federal acknowledgment of un-
acknowledged Indian groups presented to the courts before 1977 said
little about primary jurisdiction or deference to the Secretary of the
Interior. In most, if not all, of these cases 67 there was a presumption
65. 4 DAvis, supra note 48, § 22:1, at 81.
66. Id. § 12:11, at 119. In unusually terse language, the United States Supreme
Cour, provides a similar definition, in United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352
U.S. 59 (1956). The decision states:
"Primary jurisdiction" ... applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the "special competence of an administrative body; in
such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its views.
Id. at 63-64.
67. See supra note 12. The more interesting cases were those in lower federal courts
decided just prior to the promulgation of 25 C.F.R. § 83. The presumption was still
evident, but the issues surrounding federal acknowledgment of unacknowledged Indian
groups were more narrowly focused. See also Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir.), aff'g, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975); United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (,V.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (Washington 1); Narragansett Tribe v.
Southern Rhode Island Land Dev. Co., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).
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maintained by the courts that federal acknowledgment - then usually
termed "recognition" - was generally within the bailiwick of the
Secretary who had authority to recognize these tribes. However, there
was not yet a uniform, systematic procedure to determine tribal status
within the DOI, which typically turned on issues of adjudicative fact.
Thus, the courts were a logical alternative to the DOI to decide such
issues of fact. When challenges were made to tribal status by the
Secretary as in Holliday,68 the courts normally deferred to the DOI's
position.69 When the question of tribal status of unacknowledged
Indian groups arose, as in the Washington cases,70 the courts did not
hesitate to adjudicate the issue. In the absence of a uniform admin-
istrative process for determining tribal status, primary jurisdiction was
essentially a non-issue.
Litigation posed some interesting problems for the court in which
federal acknowledgment or tribal status was an issue during the liminal
stage of transition in 1977 to 1978 between no procedure and 25 C.F.R.
§ 83. Most indicative are the arguments found in Mashpee Tribe v.
New Seabury Corp.71 Plaintiff Mashpee Tribe had, in a 1977 pretrial
motion to Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee,72 moved for a contin-
uance "upon learning that the Department [of the Interior], in a
departure from previous policy, had issued proposed regulations for
determining whether to recognize tribes and that, using these regula-
tions, the Department would begin proceedings concerning the Mash-
pees." '73 This motion was denied by the district court, and this denial
was affirmed by the First Circuit. Following a lengthy discussion of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the reasons for affirming the denial
of this motion were that the DOI "does not yet have prescribed
procedures," alluding to the proposal status of the regulations at 25
C.F.R. § 83. Moveover, because of the "strong public interest in the
prompt resolution" of the case, the court must decide since the DOI's
"decision will not be available soon." 74 By far the most significant
statement of the First Circuit regarding this matter dealt exclusively
with the issue of primary jurisdiction: "It follows from what we have
said, of course, that in another case, once the Department has finally
approved its regulations and developed special expertise through ap-
plying them, we might arrive at a different answer." 7s
68. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
69. Id. at 419.
70. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
71. 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
72. 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff 'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
73. Mashpee, 592 F.2d at 580.
74. Id. at 581.
75. Id.
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One might logically think that subsequent to the point in time when
the DOI "finally approved its regulations and developed special ex-
pertise," the issue of primary jurisdiction would have been settled,
and the courts would automatically defer to the BIA (DOI) for the
resolution of acknowledgment issues. Such has not proven to be the
case. In the seven federal court cases since the promulgation of 25
C.F.R. § 83 and establishment of the BIA's Branch of Acknowledg-
ment and Research,76 the district courts and appellate courts alike have
differed in their approaches to the primary jurisdiction issue. Taking
the major cases in chronological order, the first, and most entirely
anomalous case, is the third in the series of United States v. Washington"
cases. There, five unacknowledged "intervenor" groups (Duwamish,
Samnish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, and Steilacoom) sought a judicial
federal acknowledgment for purposes of participating in the court's
ruling several years earlier in Washington I, which entitled federally
acknowledged tribes to half the commercial fish catch in the waters
of the Pacific Northwest . 7  Washington III was heard by Judge Boldt
(who also decided Washington 1) in early 1979, subsequent to the
establishment of the BIA's acknowledgment office and 25 C.F.R. §
83, and all five intervenors had petitions for federal acknowledgment
pending at the DOI.79 Notwithstanding these facts, neither the parties
nor the court mentioned the administrative process in the reported
decision. This oddity was superseded by an even greater one. The
court's "Finding of Fact #6" averred that "Neither Congress nor the
Executive Branch has prescribed any standardized definition for either
the term 'Indian' or 'Indian tribe' in terms of the special federal
76. In September 1978 the BIA created the Federal Acknowledgment Project within
the Division of Tribal Government Services. The project's sole function was to evaluate
petitions for federal acknowledgment from unacknowledged Indian groups. In 1981 the
Project officially became a branch within the Division and was renamed the Branch of
Federal Acknowledgment. In 1984 it merged with the old Branch of Tribal Services,
used to determine beneficiaries of Indian Claims Commission awards, and both became
the Branch of Acknowledgment and Research. The Branch is currently staffed by three
ethnohistorians, two cultural anthropologists, two certified "Indian Lineage Specialist"
genealogists, plus support personnel and a chief. Having evaluated 24 petitions, the
Branch's scholars have developed considerable expertise, unlikely to be matched in any
judicial proceeding either by jurists or outside expert witnesses.
77. 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979) (Washington 11).
78. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (Washington 1).
79. The dates of the initial filing of these petitions for federal acknowledgment at
the DOI by the unacknowledged intervenor groups are: Steilacoom, Sept. 28, 1973;
Snohomish, Mar. 3, 1975; Samish, June 13, 1975; Snoqualmie, Feb. 5, 1976; and
Duwniish, June 7, 1977. The petitions of the Samish and Snohomish were later denied
by the DOI. The others have yet to be evaluated due to both backlogs and lack of
sufficient data.
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relationships with Indians." 80 Even though none of the parties raised
the issue of primary jurisdiction, presumably the court could have
asserted a sua sponte deference to the DOI in light of the fact that
all intervenors were also all petitioners for federal acknowledgment.
Instead, the court ruled that none of the intervenors was a "treaty
tribe in the political sense."'8 Though it may be argued that what the
intervenors sought was a limited judicial acknowledgment for "some
purposes," it must be kept in mind that federal acknowledgment under
25 C.F.R. § 83 is for all purposes and, thus, would have secured the
disputed fishing rights for the successful petitioners.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the "third" United
States v. Washington in the fourth 2 of that series of cases, again with
no mention of the issue of primary jurisdiction or 25 C.F.R. § 83.
The conclusion that the Ninth Circuit is a world unto itself as regards
the determination of tribal existence and the concomitant issue of
primary jurisdiction may be somewhat modified by its exercise of self-
restraint in Price v. Hawaii."3 In Price the court stated that "[i]n the
absence of explicit governing statues or regulations, we will not intrude
on the traditionally executive or legislative prerogative of recognizing
a tribe's existence."' Yet this deferential treatment of the political
branches was preceded by a sentence in which the court, in evaluating
the eligibility of the Native Hawaiian Hous, stated that "[U]nder both
the BIA's current regulations for determining eligibility for federal
benefits and 'privileges and immunities,'[85] and the BIA's pre-regu-
lation standard for recognizing a tribe, the Hou fail to demonstrate
eligibility for recognition." 6 Still, it is not entirely clear, given these
facially conflicting assertions, whether the Ninth Circuit was deferring
to the executive under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or whether
it was making its own - negative - determination of tribal existence.
The eastern federal courts appear less equivocal in their consistent
deference to the executive branch through application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. In Cherokee Indians v. United Statess the issue
80. Washington III, 476 F. Supp. at 1103 (Finding of Fact #6). This finding is
wholly irreconcilable with the definitions in 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1(0, 83.7(a)-(g) (1991),
created precisely to provide a "standardized definition" for Indian tribe "in terms of
the federal relationships with Indians."
81. Washington III, 476 F. Supp. at 1111.
82. 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
83. 764 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Duwamish, Samish,
Snohomish, Snoqualmie & Steilacoom Indian Tribes v. Washington, 474 U.S. 1055
(1986).
84. Id. The court also correctly asserted that the administrative process in 25 C.F.R.
§ 83 was inapplicable to the Hou under 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(a) (1991), which limits the
scope of the regulations to American Indians indigenous to the continental United States.
85. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1991).
86. Price, 764 F.2d at 628.
R7 riv. N- R1-I11-R (MD N Ar-. "lnder the Tndinn Conmmerce Clmve nf
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of determining tribal status was left to the political branches. The
strongest and most recent statement on the issue was made by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the 1987 case of James v.
DBS:18
[D]etermination whether these documents adequately sup-
port the conclusion that the Gay Heads [Wampanoag] were
federally recognized in the middle of the nineteenth century,
or whether other factors support federal recognition, should
be made in the first instance by the Department of the
Interior since Congress has specifically authorized the Ex-
ecutive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning Indian
affairs and relations. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9. The purpose of
the regulatory scheme set up by the Secretary of the Interior
is to determine which Indian groups exist as tribes. 25
C.F.R. § 83.2. That purpose would be frustrated if the
Judicial Branch made initial determinations of whether
groups have been recognized previously or whether condi-
tions for recognition currently exist. 89
Though some federal district and appeals courts appear to have been
reluctant to dispossess themselves of the option to determine tribal
existence of unacknowledged Indian groups subsequent to 1979, the
above declaration of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals gen-
erally comports with the commentators following this specific issue. °
Finally, there are two pending cases in the federal district courts for
Arizona and Connecticut directly addressing the issue of primary
jurisdiction concerning the determination of tribal existence. Each
the United States Constitution, Congress is recognized as the branch of government
which is to determine tribal status for legal and practical purposes." COHEN, supra note
24, at 3. Both the United States and the State of North Carolina have carefully
promulgated administrative procedures through which groups can seek official tribal
recognition. See 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1991); 1 N.C. ADMiN. CODE tit. 1, §§ 15.0207-.0214.
88. 824 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 1137. Interestingly, the pocket part (the 1988 supplement) to 25 U.S.C.A.
cites James under §§ 2, 9. Keynote 4 in James, 824 F.2d at 1132, also cites 25 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2, 9. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1988) (Duties of Commissioner, Notes of
Decisions, Tribal recognition 19a); id. § 9 (Regulations by President, Notes of Decisions,
Tribal Recognition 1 la) ("Executive branch, and not judicial branch, must make initial
determination as to recognition of Indian tribe.").
90. See Weatherhead, supra note 37, at'20 ("More appropriate in these circum-
stances is ... that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply to give Interior
the first opportunity to apply its expertise to the questions presented, subject to judicial
review."); Note, The Unilateral Termination of Tribal Status: Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 31 ME. L. REv. 153, 156 n.12.1 (1979) ("The determination of tribal
existence under the regulations contained in 25 C.F.R. § 54 [now § 83] would appear
to qualify the Department of the Interior for primary administrative jurisdiction in
administering the acknowledgment program .... .").
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decision appears to take a different stance on the issue. In Sekaquap-
tewa v. MacDonald,91 the District Court of Arizona issued an order
following the BIA's positive recommendation that the federal govern-
ment acknowledge the intervenor San Juan Southern Paiute as a tribe.
The order allowed intervention but withheld determination "concerning
whether the intervenor is a 'tribe,"' essentially postponing the decision.
The court stated the "issue was to be determined at the conclusion of
trial or at such earlier time as the Court deems appropriate." '  It is
reasonable to assume that the judge was merely waiting for the BIA's
final determination regarding federal acknowledgment of the San Juan
Southern Paiutes. The judge may have hoped to base his own decision
on the BIA's determination. If so he could as easily have so stated in
his order without leaving the impression that it is rightfully the court's
decision and not the DOrs.
This ambiguity does not exist in the court's ruling on a motion to
stay the proceedings pending the BIA's determination of tribal existence
made by counsel for the Mohegans in Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut.93
Granting the motion, which was opposed by the state, the court stayed
the proceedings until the Mohegan's petition for federal acknowledg-
ment was evaluated by the BIA and a decision was rendered. The
court reasoned that "[i]f the Bureau recognizes the Mohegans as a
tribe, a central and troublesome issue in this action will have been
conclusively determined, and settlement negotiations may be encour-
aged thereby." 94 The difference in judicial attitudes between the federal
courts of the Ninth Circuit and the First and Second Circuits (or
eastern districts in general) concerning primary jurisdiction to deter-
mine the issue of federal acknowledgment of unacknowledged Indian
groups may be because so little litigation in Indian law is heard in
eastern courts. Conversely, in the West, the normal docket has at least
one Indian law case at any given time. Until the United States Supreme
Court hears a case on this issue and makes a definitive ruling as to
primary jurisdiction to determine tribal existence, this variation in
judicial attitudes among the lower courts is likely to persist.
Related closely to the central and principal issue of primary juris-
diction - which is central and principal within the framework of this
91. Civ. No. 74-842 PHX EHC (D. Ariz. filed Dec. 30, 1974) (Order of Apr. 29,
1988).
92. Id.
93. Civ. No. H-77-434 MJB (D. Conn. filed Aug. 31, 1977). The case is still
pending; it should be noted that there are two reported decisions styled Mohegan Tribe
v. Connecticut. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 483 F. Supp. 597 (D. Conn.), aff'd,
638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); Mohegan Tribe v.
Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1982). These cases concern an interlocutory
appeal from the district court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss.
94. Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, No. Civ. H-77-434 MJB (D. Conn., filed Aug.
11lt % 1 fl'flIr.A-. -C.$ M-. 0 MOlAN -~..,,: AA..Ak
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investigation for the purely pragmatic reason that the courts are most
often confronted with it - is the bipartite issue of "exclusive juris-
diction" and the "political question." As between the two parts of
this issue the political question is more complex: The political question
issue can be further subdivided into (1) original jurisdiction and (2)
reviewability.
"An agency often has exclusive jurisdiction," writes Kenneth Davis,
"which is something more than primary jurisdiction. Agencies typically
have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve issues of fact, subject to limited
review."" Exclusive jurisdiction is sometimes expressly granted in
enabling legislation establishing administrative processes. Clearly, there
is no jurisdiction of this type relative to the federal acknowledgment
of Indian tribes by the Secretary of the Interior or BIA officials. More
typically, however, exclusive jurisdiction is inferred due to absolute
control of the subject matter by one agency or the degree of technical
expertise not otherwise available to the federal government's other
branches. Although the BIA can be said to regulate Indian affairs
almost exclusively, there are still other large federal agencies, notably
the IHS and the Administration for Native Americans within the
Department of Health and Human Services, that exercise sufficient
control to preclude the BIA's claim of exclusive regulation of Indian
affairs. With regard to the technical expertise of the BIA in general,
no serious claim can be made that management of Indian affairs
requires a degree of expertise beyond the competence of the courts or
certain other agencies. Indeed, even with an area as recondite as the
ethnohistory and anthropology of tribal existence, dealing as ethno-
history and anthropology do with such diaphanous terms as commu-
nity, tribe, acculturation, and cohesion, the Mashpee court observed
that "[tihe facts in this case, though developed and interpreted in part
with the expert help of historians and anthropologists, are not so
technical as to be beyond the understanding of judges or juries." 96
Thus, under none of the above criteria could the BIA reasonably be
said to have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs generally or over
the determination of tribal existence and federal acknowledgment spe-
cifically.
Both federal court judges in their decisions and legal commentators
in arlicles and books have written extensively on the concept of the
95. 4 DAVIs, supra note 48, § 22:1, at 84.
96. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 581 (1st Cir. 1979). But
see Note, supra note 90, at 155 n.12.1 ("Competency to decide tribal existence may rest
exclusivelj with the executive branch under the acknowledgment regulations, due to its
superior information and expertise and the statutory grants of authority to the President
and the Secretary of the Interior to manage 'all matters arising out of Indian relations."')
(emphasis added).
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nonjusticiable political questionY1 Examination of this doctrine herein
is on the considerably narrower issue of whether judicial determination
of tribal existence is a political question. Specifically, the bipartite
issue is (1) whether the federal judiciary has the original jurisdiction
to create a semi-sovereign entity by deciding an Indian group is a tribe
for certain or all purposes, effectively conferring federal acknowledg-
ment; and (2) whether, once the Congress or the DOI has so acknowl-
edged an Indian group, the federal courts may either review or strike
down such congressional or executive acknowledgment.
The first part of the issue entails the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
which determines when - not whether - a federal court may preempt
agency prerogative to decide the issue of tribal existence. Assuming
the agency does not have exclusive jurisdiction, the presumption is
that a court may intercede in the agency's procedure, if warranted, at
the court's discretion. The chief issue in this part of the political
doctrine question is essentially the reverse: whether - not when - a
federal court has jurisdiction to determine tribal existence. The simple
answer is, probably yes. The landmark case of Baker v. Carr9 ad-
dressed this point directly. The Court alluded to its usual "deference
to the political departments in determining whether Indians are rec-
ognized as a tribe,"9 citing Holliday. The Court stated that this issue
reflected "familiar attributes of political questions," but added (in
what should be the epitaph of Indian law once deceased) that it also
has "a unique element" and therefore concluded that there is "no
blanket rule.' ' 1°
The precise issue of whether a federal court has jurisdiction to
determine the existence of a tribe was squarely addressed in Joint
Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton.'0 1 The court
rejected Maine's intervenor argument that the court lacked jurisdiction
because the case presented a nonjusticiable political question. The
decisions the state cited as authority for its argument dealt "solely
with the power of Congress to legislate with respect to Indians."' 02
97. See generally LAURENCE H. TRmE, AmBucAx CoNsrrruvoNAL LAW 71-79
(1978); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976); Christopher A. Johnson & Thomas B. McAffee, Note, A Dialogue on the
Political Question Doctrine, 3 UTAH L. Rzv. 523 (1978); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
The case law is too extensive to cite generally.
98. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
99. Id. at 215-16.
100. Id.
101. 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 664. The political question doctrine is most commonly couched in terms
of Congress' power in relation to the separation of powers. Yet it can and does apply
to administrative executive prerogative and authority as well, whether sul generis or
delegated, and is used here in both the congressional and executive sense.
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"It is clear," the court concluded, "that this case presents no non-
justiciable political question."' 03 It would appear, then, that following
the rules set forth in Baker and Passamaquoddy, federal courts may
resolve a dispute over or otherwise determine for certain purposes the
issue of tribal existence of an unacknowledged Indian group where the
political branches have not yet made such determination. In other
words, such a judicial determination is not a nonjusticiable political
question.
Once the political branches have spoken, however, and federally
acknowledged an Indian tribe, the situation changes. This circumstance
invokes the traditional "Indian political question," the second part of
the bipartite issue. The issue is framed as whether, once Congress or
the DOI has acknowledged a tribe, the federal courts may review or
strike down such acknowledgment. 10 The simple answer is probably
no. The commentators and the case law agree this preclusion of the
judiciary to review or strike down a prior congressional or executive
acknowledgment is provisional. The proviso stems from the Court's
ruling in the seminal case of Sandoval,10 5 where the Court held that
however plenary the power of Congress may be over Indian affairs,
and however much of that power is delegated to the executive for the
purpose of acknowledging Indian tribes, "Congress may [not] bring a
community or body of people within the range of this power by
103. Id. But see United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101, 1110-11 (W.D.
Wash. 1979) (Washington II1) ("[The determination of what [tribal] entities may exercise
political control over communal rights secured by treaties with respect to the taking of
fish and other wildlife is a political question requiring determination or concurrence by
the political authorities of the United States."); cf. Delaware Tribal Business Comm.
v. Weekcs, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1976).
104. The bulk of commentary about the Indian political question doctrine concerns
this aspect of it. For example, Felix Cohen states that
[w]hen Congress or the Executive has found that a tribe exists, courts will
riot normally disturb such a determination. Some older cases have char-
ecterized such determinations as political questions, outside the scope of
judicial review .... For most current purposes, judicial deference to find-
ings of tribal existence is still mandated by the extensive nature of con-
gressional power in the field.
CoEHN, supra note 24, at 3; cf. Robert N. Clinton & Margaret T. Hotopp, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of
the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REv. 17, 64 (1979) ("When, however, Congress
or the Secretary, acting pursuant to congressional authorization, has formally recognized
an aggregation of Indians as a tribe, the issue of tribal existence becomes a political
question... Thus, the courts will neither review the tribal status of a federally recognized
tribe nor disturb the prior recognition of a tribe by the federal government."); see also
Weatherhead, supra note 37, at 8; Tureen, Federal Recognition and the "Passama-
quoddy" Decision, REPORT ON TERMINATEm AND NONFEDERALLY RECOONIZIED INDIANS,
TAsic FORCE #10 (FNAL REPORT, AIPRC) at 1671 (1979).
105. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/3
No. 1] FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TRIBES 65
arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe. . ". ."106 This proscription,
combined with later rulings that use of Congress plenary power over
Indian affairs must be rationally related to purposes of the government-
to-government relationship,1°7 effectively limits this plenary power.
Thus, as the Court held in Baker, normally and as a practical matter
the courts will defer to and not interfere with a political branch's prior
acknowledgment owing to the issue's status as a nonjusticiable political
question, except when such acknowledgment is arbitrary: "Able to
discern what is 'distinctly Indian' . . . the courts will strike down any
heedless extension of that label. They will not stand impotent before
an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power."108
Because the matter has never been tried before, it is not clear whether
a federal court could properly overturn a BIA decision made under
25 C.F.R. § 83 concerning the acknowledgment of an Indian group if
the court found malfeasance or misfeasance in the administrative
procedure to be "arbitrary and capricious." It is not clear whether
this judicial trespass into the "political" arena .would violate the
nonjusticiable political question doctrine as described above.1°9
106. Id. at 46.
107. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Delaware Tribal Business Com-
mittee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); see also United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
371 (1980).
108. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961). To borrow some succinct phraseology
from Allogan Slagle, "Federal acknowledgment does not 'create' a tribe where none
existed." Allogan Slagle, A Byline of Warning Barks, NEws FROM NAnVE CAL. (Berkeley,
Cal.), July/August 1987, at 19 (vol. 1, no. 3).
109. This is an intriguing question, which must be left to future study. This study
should examine the issues of administrative adjudication and judicial review of such
determinations in the context of 25 C.F.R. § 83, with all that this entails, e.g., use of
discretion, consistency of standards and decisions, role of staff, and implications for
decision makers under the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948). More
intriguing still, is the effect of judicial reversal of a BIA acknowledgment upon the
United States' relationship with the tribe or, conversely, the similar effect upon an
Indian group previously denied acknowledgment by a federal court but subsequently
acknowledged by the BIA. This last question is asked, but not answered, in a student
note on Mashpee:
One consequence of falling to defer adjudication on the Mashpees' tribal
existence is the possibility of reopening the judgment in a suit by the
United States as trustee of the tribe under [the Indian Reorganization Act].
The United States is not bound by the judgment in Mashpee . . ., and the
Department of the Interior may yet acknowledge the tribe's existence upon
determination of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe's petition for acknow-
ledgment.
Note, supra note 90, at 156. Whether the DOI's decision is binding upon federal courts,
or a federal court decision is binding upon the DOI vis-a-vis federal acknowledgment
of a tribe, and whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable,
are all unsettled issues. Such clashes may yet appear as regards the federal acknowledg-
ment of the Duwamish, Steilacoom, Snoqualmie, Mashpee Wampanoag, and San Juan
Southern Pautes.
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It is perhaps fitting to end this discussion with an examination of
the doctrine of exhaustion. That doctrine requires exhaustion of all
available or remaining internal agency rebuttal or review procedures
before seeking relief in federal court. Of course exhaustion presupposes
that, in light of the nonjusticiable political question, judicial review is
available at least for adverse BIA decisions regarding the federal
acknowledgment of an Indian tribe. Operating on the assumption that
such review is available under chapter 7 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA),"0 the central questions regarding exhaustion become,
similar to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,"' when or at what
point during the administrative proceeding the federal courts may
undertake to adjudicate an agency/client dispute. One might also ask
whether the courts can interpose at all because of a statutory or
regulatory exhaustion requirement.
The general theory within the judicial system is that courts of appeal
only review final action of the lower courts and not interlocutory
action. As a general theory the same principle applies to administrative
agencies' decisions. In federal courts difficult and controlling questions
of law may be reviewed by higher courts as interlocutory decisions,
but this review is strictly governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292. However, as
Kenneth Davis points out, "No comparable provision governs review
of administrative action.1" 2 What does govern the exhaustion doctrine
regarding administrative action is basically the adequacy of the internal
agency review process, determined on an ad hoe or case-by-case basis
using an unwritten objective "reasonable and prudent" standard." 3
The APA does provide some guidance, stating that "Agency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is
no other adequate remedy in court are subject to judicial review.""
4
110. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1988).
111. Exhaustion is not exactly the obverse of primary jurisdiction but is closely
related. The former governs judicial jurisdiction during the administrative process and
anticipates intervening in that process; the latter governs original jurisdiction before the
administrative process has begun and anticipates preempting that process. The decision
in a Connecticut case spells out the distinction with clarity. See Sharkey v. Stamford,
492 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1985).
112. 4 DAvis, supra note 48, § 26:10, at 455-56.
113. Id.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (emphasis added). What is relevant here is the wording
in the APA:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise
final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any
form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule
and provides that the action is meanwhile inoperative, for an appeal to
superior agency authority.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare the emphasized wording with the language in 25 C.F.R.
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However, Davis adds that "(1) the term 'final' is variously interpreted
and (2) the courts often ignore the statute.""' 5 Because 25 C.F.R. §
83.10(a) both requires and defines finality pursuant to the APA in
acknowledgment decisions, it seems clear - "seems" because the total
lack of consistency in federal court decisions on the exhaustion issue
will not allow an unequivocal term - that exhaustion of DOI rebuttal
and review procedures is required in the event of a challenge to such
a decision.
The controlling federal court cases agree. In Coyote Band of Pomo
Indians v. United States"6 the court simply stated, "The APA requires
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review.""' More
recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in James addressed
the exhaustion issue directly as it relates to the DOI's federal acknow-
ledgment decisions:
Further, requiring exhaustion allows the Department of the
Interior the opportunity to apply its developed expertise in
the area of tribal recognition. The Department of the In-
terior's Branch of Acknowledgment and Research was es-
tablished for determining whether groups seeking tribal
recognition actually constitute Indian tribes and presumably
to determine which tribes have previously obtained federal
recognition, see 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(b) ... It is apparent that
the agency should be given the opportunity to apply its
expertise prior to judicial involvement." 8
Therefore, despite the various exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine,
and consistent with the dictates of the 5 U.S.C. § 704 and the James
decision, it seems a virtually incontrovertible conclusion that parties
challenging an adverse decision by the Secretary of the Interior con-
§ 83.10(a):
The Assistant Secretary's decision shall be final for the Department unless
the Secretary requests him to reconsider within 60 days of such publication.
If the Secretary recommends reconsideration, the Assistant Secretary shall
consult with the Secretary, review his initial determination, and issue a
reconsidered decision within 60 days which shall be final and effective
upon publication.
25 C.F.R. § 83.10(a) (1991).
115. 4 DAvis, supra note 48, § 26:10, at 456.
116. 639 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
117. Id. at 168 n.5. As authority for this assertion, the court cited 5 U.S.C. § 704
and Lloyd C. Lockrem, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1979). For an
enumeration of primary purposes of the exhaustion doctrine, see, e.g., Andrade v.
Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a statement of some exceptions to the
doctrine, of which there are several, see ScwARz, supra note 48, at 733.
118. James v. DHS, 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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cerning the federal acknowledgment of an Indian tribe under 25 C.F.R.
§ 83 must exhaust the administrative rebuttal and appeal process before
haling the Secretary, the DOI, or the BIA into federal court.
IV. Conclusion
No one seriously doubts that the President or his Secretary of State
has the authority, or even the exclusive jurisdiction, to recognize the
new government of a foreign nation. Similarly, few would doubt that
such recognition is a nonjusticiable political question in which the
federal courts have no jurisdiction. Had Justice Thompson not been
in the minority in Cherokee Nation, concluding that "[tiesting the
character and condition of the Cherokee Indians by these rules, it is
not perceived how it is possible to escape the conclusion, that they
form a sovereign state,"" 9 it may be that today the Department of
-State, rather that the Department of the Interior, would be federally
acknowledging Indian tribes. But the writhes of history produced a
different fate for the Cherokee Nation, and by extension for all other
Indian tribes as well, when the majority's opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall announced that they were "domestic dependent nations"
whose relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to
his guardian."'' 2 And so the anomalous and ambiguous corpus of
federal Indian law had its effective beginning, reflecting the anomalous
and ambiguous status of Indian tribes and Indian groups within the
United States.
One belated step toward the amelioration of this general ambiguity
was the promulgation of 25 C.F.R. § 83 in 1978. These regulations
have not as yet settled conclusively all the problems attendant to the
determination of tribal existence. However, these regulations have
gradually brought some needed order and clarification to a once wholly
confused area. Moreover, time will doubtless establish both 25 C.F.R.
§ 83 and the acknowledgment office at the BIA as permanent forces
in terms of dispositive action regarding the federal acknowledgment
of Indian tribes. The existence of the regulations and the acknowledg-
ment office, with its record of twenty-four acknowledgment decisions,
has added to the Secretary of Interior's arsenal with which he can
defend, or justify, his authority to acknowledge tribes.
The trend of federal courts since 1978, in addition to the explicit
pronouncement in James, has nearly established an automatic deference
to the primary jurisdiction of the BIA when the issue of tribal existence
comes before a federal court. Closely related to the primary jurisdiction
119. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 52 (1831) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id. at 16.
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issue, assuming an adverse BIA decision under 25 C.F.R. § 83 is
reviewable under the APA, the regulations provide for final action by
the Secretary and exhaustion of administrative review procedure before
relief is sought in federal court. Whatever may be the problems
associated with delays and slowness of the petition evaluation process
under 25 C.F.R. § 83, which were not within the scope of this
comment, the positive legal effects described throughout would appear
to outweigh them.
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